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ABSTRACT
Since hardware oftentimes serves as the root of trust in our
modern interconnected world, malicious hardware manipu-
lations constitute a ubiquitous threat in the context of the
Internet of Things (IoT). Hardware reverse engineering is a
prevalent technique to detect such manipulations.
Over the last years, an active research community has sig-
nificantly advanced the field of hardware reverse engineering.
Notably, many open research questions regarding the extrac-
tion of functionally correct netlists from Field Programmable
Gate Arrays (FPGAs) or Application Specific Integrated
Circuits (ASICs) have been tackled. In order to facilitate
further analysis of recovered netlists, a software framework is
required, serving as the foundation for specialized algorithms.
Currently, no such framework is publicly available.
Therefore, we provide the first open-source gate-library
agnostic framework for gate-level netlist analysis. In this
positional paper, we demonstrate the workflow of our modular
framework HAL on the basis of two case studies and provide
profound insights on its technical foundations.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In an increasingly interconnected world, hardware compo-
nents serve as the root of trust in virtually any comput-
ing system. Therefore malicious hardware manipulations of
mission-critical components can have serious implications,
ranging from simple revenue loss over faults in critical infras-
tructure up to life-threatening consequences [8].
On the one hand hardware reverse engineering is the tool-
of-choice to identify such manipulations, and to check the
trustworthiness of hardware in general [3, 8]. It encompasses
the detection of potentially harmful counterfeits and copy-
right infringements. On the other hand, hardware reverse
engineering is often used to insert hardware Trojans [28],
which weakens the security of a system or to commit said
copyright infringements by trying to counterfeit or simply
copy intellectual property.
Since hardware reverse engineering is a highly complex
process, semi-automated tools are desperately needed by the
community [31].
In the world of software reverse engineering comprehensive
and expandable frameworks covering the complete workflow
of binary analysis exist, e.g., IDA Pro or Ghidra. However,
for hardware reversing there is no such framework yet [27]
but loose collections of scripts, e.g., [13]. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to release a fully customizable
open source gate-level netlist reverse engineering framework
[9] to the open-source community via GitHub1.
We encourage the community to conduct their own research
using our framework in the field, to write and publish plugins
for specialized reverse engineering tasks, and to support
the development of HAL as a whole. To get the interested
parties started, we provide guidance for the rich feature
set and its technical foundations for both HAL users and
developers. Furthermore, we demonstrate the usage of HAL
by means of two case studies: Reverse engineering Finite
State Machines (FSMs), and finding watermarks.
2 BACKGROUND
In the following section we provide the essential background
information for the topic of chip-level reverse engineering and
introduce the field of gate-level netlist reverse engineering.
1HAL, https://github.com/emsec/hal
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2.1 Chip-Level Reverse Engineering
With chip-level reverse engineering, an attacker extracts a
human-readable gate-level netlist from the examined Inte-
grated Circuit (IC) or FPGA.
During this phase no functional analysis of the netlist
takes place. Only in the gate-level netlist reverse engineering
step conducted later, the attacker analyzes the chip’s logical
functionality.
FPGA Reverse Engineering. Due to its volatile nature
SRAM-based FPGAs are reconfigured on every boot-up by
an externally stored bitstream. The bitstream contains the
configuration of the basic FPGA elements, i.e., which Boolean
function is evaluated in a Look-up table (LUT) and how these
logical functions are connected via the routing. For reversing
an FPGA bitstream, an attacker has to (i) extract the bit-
stream from the external memory, (ii) reverse the bitstream
file format, and (iii) convert the downloaded bitstream to a
human-readable netlist.
For retrieving the bitstream the attacker can either wiretap
the configuration lines on the PCB, or directly read out the
flash memory. Even if the attacker encounters an encrypted
bitstream the chances of recovery are high as shown in [14–
17, 24]. The bitstream file format reversing process has been
described in recent papers [2, 5, 7, 11, 18–21, 25, 32]. All
these works use the correlation method. Here, the attacker
creates a basic design containing an instantiation of the
examined FPGA element, e.g., a LUT, Flip Flop (FF), or the
routing. In the next step, the attacker varies the elements’
configuration and creates one bitstream from the basic design
and one from the modified design. The difference between
both bitstreams correlates to the introduced changes in the
altered design. Using the correlation method the attacker can
build a database of bitstream bits and their corresponding
configuration in the netlist. Using this database, the attacker
can convert the bitstream under attack to a human-readable
netlist.
IC Reverse Engineering. In contrast to FPGAs, reversing
ICs requires several steps and is considerably more complex
due to shrinking technology sizes [8, 12, 22, 27]. The reversing
steps consist of (i) decapsulating, (ii) delayering, (iii) image
acquisition, and (iv) image processing in order to generate
the human-readable netlist.
First, the IC is decapsulated mostly using wet or dry
chemistry to remove the organic package material or by using
mechanical means. The chemicals can fully remove the pack-
aging, while not damaging the silicon die. In the next step,
the chip is delayered and images of each layer are acquired.
This step depends on the used manufacturing technologies,
thus there exist several delayering techniques. On today’s
feature sizes, the first passivation layer is often removed with
dry anisotropic etching. The next metal layers are removed
via plasma etching or ion milling. The difficulties are the
over-etching – especially of the die’s edges – or warpages
due to the mechanical stress between the substrate and the
metal layer. Each of these layers are digitized via a Scanning
Electron Microscope (SEM) or a Focused Ion Beam (FIB).
The remaining metal layers and oxide layer is then removed
with diamond suspension and dry chemistry. Using fluoric
acid the active regions of the chip are revealed.
After acquiring all images from each layer the images are
stitched together. Here, precise alignment is crucial to intro-
duce no faulty transitions between two neighboring images.
Finally, software assisted image processing generates the
human-readable netlist by identifying standard cells first and
reconstructing the connections in the metal layer second.
2.2 Gate-level Netlist Reverse Engineering
A gate-level netlist is a representation of a set of logic gates
from a particular gate library together with their interconnec-
tions [29]. Combinational logic is usually implemented with
Boolean gates or Look-up tables (LUTs) and multiplexers,
while sequential logic is realized through Flip Flops (FFs) or
latches. All these elements are defined by the regarding gate
library. Netlists can either be represented textually via HDL
or as a graph, where the edges depict connections and the
nodes represent gates.
The absence of (1) meaningful descriptive labels, (2) bound-
aries of implemented modules, and (3) module hierarchies in
flat gate-level netlists drastically complicates the process of
gate-level netlist reverse engineering [8].
However, the representation as a graph facilitates the appli-
cation of graph-based algorithms, which can help identifying
the control logic or restoring certain module boundaries and
hierarchies. A further approach consists in the detection of
unique (logical) structures in the netlist.
3 HAL – THE HARDWARE ANALYZER
HAL aids analysts with a rich feature set to facilitate ex-
plorative functionality recovery of gate-level netlists in a
semi-automated fashion. To this end HAL processes netlists
in its own graph-based representation (cf. Section 2.2). Note
that HAL itself is gate-library agnostic, hence it can be used
to analyze netlists of ASICs as well as FPGAs.
Figure 1 shows a high-level overview of the main workflow
and core features of HAL. An analyst can either parse a
new netlist into HAL or continue previous work by loading a
snapshot file. After HAL has loaded the netlist, the analyst
can use HAL’s graph core to freely traverse or even manipulate
the netlist. This can be done in an explorative manner in the
GUI, either via the Python shell or by direct interaction with
the graph view. To perform time-critical algorithms without
the performance penalties of Python, custom C++ plugins
can be used, even via the Python shell. All actions performed
are documented in log files and plugins can access their own
logging channels to allow for straightforward report filtering.
Changes to the graph, regardless of the origin, are directly
reflected in the GUI elements, allowing the analyst to not
only logically but also visually partition the netlist. At any
point in time, the analyst can create a snapshot of the current
graph representation, that can be used to resume analysis
later or revert to an earlier state.
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Figure 1: Overview of the original HAL architecture from [9] (modified)
Note that the GUI is entirely optional. Hence, HAL can be
executed as a stand-alone command line tool, offering its full
range of features except for visualization. After performing
modifications, the analyst can choose to write the netlist back
into a an HDL format, resulting in a synthesizable gate-level
netlist.
Open Source Release. Due to the growing demand from the
scientific community we decided to publicly release HAL. The
source code is available on GitHub (cf. Section 1) under the
open-source MIT license. We hope that HAL will be of use to
the research community and encourage interested developers
to contribute to the project via GitHub. We support both
Linux and macOS as the Operating System (OS).
Technical Foundation
Throughout the development of HAL various aspects regard-
ing the performance, usability, and modular expandability
had to be considered. The following section highlights the
emerged issues and presents our solutions.
The Core System. Since complex gate-level netlists are
composed of several thousands up to billions of gates and
interconnections, performance posed an urgent issue from
the very beginning of the development of HAL.
gate net
netlist submodule
Figure 2: Simplified HAL netlist library class diagram
Therefore, the low-level programming language C++17
was chosen to implement the underlying core system. Here
the netlist library, which represents the data structure for all
elements of a netlist, constitutes the crucial component. The
class diagram in Figure 2 depicts the relationship between
the core classes.
In contrast to off-the-shelf graph libraries, the netlist li-
brary has the following distinct properties, which are specifi-
cally designed for netlist processing.
Gate Each gate object has a gate type (e.g., NAND, NOR, . . . )
dynamically assigned based on the underlying gate li-
brary while parsing the netlist. Additional information,
e.g., LUT configuration strings, FF init values, etc.,
are stored directly in the gate object.
Net In contrast to classical edges with a single source and
sink a net in our library allows to have multiple sinks.
Submodule To add hierarchy information during the reverse
engineering process additional submodules can be de-
fined. Each submodule lists the gates and nets belong-
ing to the submodule.
In addition to the core module, the netlist library introduces
an event system allowing other components to be notified
when the underlying data model changes its information.
This is specifically necessary for interactive components like
the Graphical User Interface (GUI).
The Plugin System. Due to the collision between the re-
quirement of working on netlist reversing projects under an
Non Disclosure Agreement (NDA) and the goal to provide a
collaborative open-source framework to the community, we
decided to introduce a plugin system. It allows leaving the
core parts of the system public while project-specific elements
can be placed in a plugin without the necessity to publish
them. The plugin system is realized through C++ dynamic li-
braries which are loaded on demand by the core. This allows
for straightforward parallelization of computation-intense
tasks, for example via OpenMP.
As an example, we provide a plugin for dynamic graph anal-
yses called graph-algorithm which allows further processing
of a netlist in HAL using the Boost Graph library2.
2Boost Graph Library, https://www.boost.org/doc/libs/1_66_0/libs/
graph/doc/index.html
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Figure 3: Screenshot of the HAL Graphical User Interface during the Reverse Engineering Process
The Graphical User Interface. While algorithmic analyses
of netlists are a powerful tool, there are cases where the visual
inspection of a design is necessary. Therefore, our Qt53-based
GUI provides a performant graphical representation even
for large netlists and enables interactive navigation with
mouse and keyboard through the graph. At the same time,
a navigation pane ensures that the user always maintains
an overview, while additional information about the selected
netlist component is displayed in a detail pane.
A further GUI-feature is the color-based submodule high-
lighting, which supports users in the process of understanding
the inner workings of a design in combination with self-
developed plugins for algorithmic analyses.
Altogether, the GUI facilitates the reverse engineers’ task
to process the given information and to make sense of a
formerly unknown design [30].
Python Integration. To lower the barrier of entry for new
HAL users and developers, we embedded a Python shell into
the GUI. The Python shell provides an efficient and intuitive
approach to interact with a netlist; whereas the development
of custom C++ plugins offers full flexibility, but requires
more experience.
From a technical perspective, we employed pybind114to
map the C++ API to the smaller and simpler Python API.
All function calls from the fully-featured Python 3.7.2 in-
terpreter to the core are handled by the C++ back-end to
preserve its performance advantages.
3Qt5, https://www.qt.io/
4Pybind11, https://github.com/pybind/pybind11
4 CASE STUDIES
In the following we present two case studies demonstrating
the capabilities and flexibility of HAL in reverse engineering
gate-level netlists.
4.1 Reverse Engineering Finite States Machines
Since an FSM controls almost every hardware design it
presents a promising attack target for reverse engineers. Fyr-
biak et al. [10] proposed a method for finding FSM circuits
in a netlist as well as a way of retrieving the corresponding
state-graph. For extracting FSMs from a netlist a plugin in
HAL has been created.
State
Transition
Logic
Output Logic
State
Memory
Input
Figure 4: Block diagram of a hardware FSM (dashed line in
the case of a Mealy machine) from [9]
From a mathematical perspective FSMs are equivalent
to a Strongly Connected Component (SSC) (see Figure 4).
There are several algorithms from graph theory that can
be used to identify SSCs. In HAL we implemented Tarjan’s
Algorithm [26] to identify SSCs in our own graph_algorithm
plugin. Once the plugin has been loaded, the corresponding
functions can operate on the netlist and report back the
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results to the main program, where they can be used for
further analysis.
After the correct FSM circuit has been identified, the
state graph can be retrieved by analyzing the Boolean logic
of the state transition logic. We conducted our analysis for
FPGA netlists, which incorporate mostly LUTs to realize the
logic. Using the functionalities provided by gate-decorators,
HAL offers the possibility to generate a Binary Decision
Diagram (BDD) representing the logic expression for one
or multiple LUT-gates. A gate-decorator extends the al-
ready available functions for gates provided by the gate
class. Gate-decorators are specific for every gate-library.
This means, for porting said method to extract FSMs from
ASIC netlists, one has to provide the specific definitions of
the gate-library in order to generate the corresponding BDD.
With the help of the generated BDDs, we can brute-force
all reachable states for reasonably bounded FSMs without
the need for further libraries. Of course, computation time
grows quickly with the complexity of the feedback logic and
the FSM state register’s size. In the end, we output the state
graph as a GRAPHVIZ .dot file.
Circumventing FSM Obfuscation. Obfuscation describes
the transformation, which obstructs high-level information
without changing functionality while increasing the complex-
ity of the reverse engineering process in mind.
Fyrbiak et al. [10] also described means of attacking several
well-known obfuscation schemes operating on the FSM-level
[1, 4, 6]. Since HAL offers netlist manipulation techniques,
we can efficiently implement a plugin to circumvent, remove,
or disable obfuscation techniques.
𝑠O0start
𝑠O1
𝑠O2
𝑠O3 𝑠
O
4
𝑠A0 𝑠
A
1 𝑠
A
2
𝑠0
𝑠1
𝑠2
𝑠3
𝑖0 𝑖1
𝑖2
Figure 5: Obfuscated FSM using HARPOON [4, 10]
One of the most popular obfuscation schemes is HAR-
POON [4]. The basic idea of HARPOON - see Figure 5 -
envisages a designer inserting a second FSM (highlighted in
red) to protect the original FSM (highlighted in blue). The
inserted FSM part has to be traversed in a certain way, using
a specific input sequence called the enabling key. Every other
input sequence than the enabling key will not lead to the
original FSM, thus rendering the hardware design unusable
for unauthorized parties [31].
Fyrbiak et al. [10] proposed a general attack idea to (i) find
a HARPOON key and (ii) remove the HARPOON key from
the netlist. We introduce and use these attack ideas to present
various features of HAL, e.g., the netlist manipulation, and
plugin features. First, with the brute-force attack described
in Section 4.1, we executed the FSM detection plugin and
read the HARPOON enabling key from the extracted state
graph.
Second, we completely changed the behavior of the state
machine and generate a manipulated netlist. For that, we use
the netlist manipulation feature of HAL. Changing the initial
value of the Flip-Flops from the state memory to the values
of the initial state of the original FSM results in omitting
the obfuscated part. This removing of the obfuscation FSMs
is possible as we know the initial states from the first attack
step. The manipulated netlist can be written to either Verilog
or Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Hardware Descrip-
tion Language (VHDL). In case of an FPGAs netlist, a new
bitstream can be generated with the corresponding vendor
tools. HAL even allows manipulating the transition logic and
thus manipulating the behavior of the state machine.
4.2 Finding Watermarks
In the context of hardware design, a watermark is a secret or
hidden message inside a circuit that enables the owner of the
design to identify his work. It is usually used in the context
of IP-infringement to identify intellectual property.
I0
I1
I2
O
LUT3
a
b
GND
c
I2 I1 I0 O
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 Y
1 0 1 Y
1 1 0 Y
1 1 1 Y
Figure 6: Overview of the watermarking scheme
Wallat et al. [28] proposed ways for identifying and remov-
ing a watermark scheme presented by Schmid et al. [23] for
FPGAs.
The scheme makes use of the fact that sometimes not all
inputs of a LUT are in use. If a LUT has an unused input, it
is usually being connected to either GND or VCC – respectively
logic ’0’ or ’1’ . If a LUT has an input connected to GND
or VCC it results in unreachable entries in the truth table
– see Figure 6 – the entries marked with Y are the entries
that cannot be reached. Their watermarking scheme inserts
a unique sequence into these unreachable entries to uniquely
mark a design.
We used HAL to identify LUTs that were used for the
watermarking by analyzing the LUT content of all LUTs that
have GND or VCC connected. For each of these LUTs the LUT
content is analyzed for entries that where not set to ’0’, when
they cannot occur. This way the watermarking can easily be
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identified. Furthermore we removed the watermarking using
HAL, by manipulating the LUT’s content using the netlist
manipulation feature.
5 CONCLUSION
Hardware reverse engineering as the tool-of-choice to examine
hardware designs for their functionality and potential manip-
ulations, or to detect product counterfeits. Due to the lack of
publicly available and fully-customizable frameworks assisting
the gate-level netlist reversing process we present our gate-
level netlist reverse engineering framework HAL. Furthermore
we present its rich feature set providing visual and algorithmic
access to gate level netlists, as well as its technical founda-
tions to get potential users started. In an effort to involve
the open-source community into the development, we release
the HAL source code on https://github.com/emsec/hal under
the MIT open-source license.
A main feature of HAL is the representation of the netlist
as a graph which enables further graph-based analyses. In
two case studies we demonstrated the manifold capabilities
of HAL: First, we illustrate the creation of plugins to simplify
the netlist reverse engineering process in a practical context.
Second, we demonstrated how the graph_algorithm plugin
can be applied to identify structures and modules within
the flat netlist. In the end, the powerful manipulation fea-
ture shows how the behavior of a netlist can be changed to
circumvent real-world obfuscation techniques.
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